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Just as the history of science usually presumes that the scientists who do their 
disciplines already exist, the history of art has assumed since time immemorial that 
artists are the natural protagonists of the business that produces works of art, and 
that these players have always existed as well. What would happen if we rotated 
the conceptual stage ninety degrees in both cases? What would happen if we 
observed artists in their efforts to become artists in the first place? We could then 
see every phenomenon on this field more or less from a side view and, alongside 
the familiar history of art as a history of completed works, we could obtain a history 
of the training that made it possible to do art and the ascetism that shaped artists.  
    –Peter Sloterdijk, The Art of Philosophy 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This essay describes Peter Sloterdijk’s “side view” of philosophy. That is, it describes 
the self-disciplines that make philosophical activity possible. Along similar lines, the paper draws 
on the work of Pierre Hadot, who also reads philosophy as an askēsis or exercise of self-
transformation. Bringing together the work of Sloterdijk and Hadot, the essay reframes the 
question, What is Philosophy? by asking, Who is the philosopher? To this end, the essays 
synthesizes the work of Hadot and Sloterdijk, describing first the philosopher’s exercises of self-
transformation, then their relation to the city and the community at a large, and finally their 
connection to the practice zones, enclaves, and microclimates, to use Sloterdijk’s terms, that 
enable the philosopher to perform certain maneuvers in thought. The paper concludes with an 
assessment of Sloterdijk’s global view of human practice—which he calls “the planet of the 
practicing”—to suggest that a planetary perspective should hold a privileged view for future 
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philosophical inquiries. Who are the philosophers? They are the practitioners of planet Earth, 
the ascetic planet. 
KEYWORDS: Peter Sloterdijk; Pierre Hadot; askēsis; media ecology; epoché; affordances; ecology 
of practices; somatic idealism; anthropotechnics 
 
 
 
The French historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot (1922–2010) is best known for his 
reading of philosophy as a way of life. “Philosophical discourse,” writes Hadot, 
“originates in a choice of life and an existential option.”1 In linking life and philosophy, 
Hadot demonstrates that the choice of how to live does not lie at the end of philosophical 
investigation but at its beginning, that philosophy from the outset is the application of a 
certain ideal of life, exercised in community. Hadot continues, “I mean, then, that 
philosophical discourse must be understood from the perspective of the way of life of 
which it is both the expression and the means. Consequently, philosophy is above all a 
way of life, but one which is intimately linked to philosophical discourse.”2 
Both the expression and the means. This is the key to entering Hadot’s reading of 
philosophy, and perhaps to entering the philosophical life for one’s own self. Linking 
expression and means through practice also brings us into the orbit of what the 
contemporary German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (b. 1947) calls a “side view” of 
philosophy, a history of the training that made it possible to do philosophy and the 
ascetism that shaped philosophers. 
The side view of philosophy does not describe philosophical knowledge, systems, 
concepts, disputes, or figures as ready-made objects of investigation. Instead, it traces 
the history of practices and techniques that enabled those who engage in philosophy to 
perform their work. In this way, the Greek aphorism “know thyself” (gnōthi  seauton), 
inscribed onto the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, is joined in Sloterdijk’s work with an 
equally forceful injunction, drawn from the last line of Rainer Maria Rilke’s poem 
“Archaic Torso of Apollo.” The line reads simply, “You must change your life.” 
In taking up the side view, Sloterdijk resembles the Socrates of Plato’s Apology. 
Philosophy, says Socrates, is not so much about knowing this or that as it is about being 
this or that way (29d–e). As a matter of being, philosophical activity is closely tied to the 
actions of the person, and specifically to the person’s ability to apply the mind to itself. 
“We must not avoid constantly and rigorously examining the way we live,” Hadot writes 
                                                          
1 Pierre Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 3 
2 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
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of the Socratic approach.3 This approach is what makes Socrates’s interlocutors place 
themselves in question as Socrates reveals their internal contradictions through his 
dialectical interrogations.4 This task of questioning, given to Socrates by the Oracle at 
Delphi (in yet another reference to the god Apollo), is what drives those around Socrates 
to examine truth and knowledge from within their own souls.5 
This does not mean that philosophy is not interested in knowledge or truth, quite 
the opposite. It means that knowledge and truth are not the kinds of things that can be 
directly received or transmitted. Humans are not data retrieval centers or simple 
information processing computers of any kind. As Hadot notes, neither knowledge nor 
truth “can be received ready-made, but must be engendered by the individual.”6 
Philosophy on Hadot’s account is thus a kind of askēsis, a discipline of self-
transformation, oriented around a set of practices unique to each school of philosophy.7 
Sloterdijk’s side view charts just this history of askēsis, in a way re-framing the 
question, What is philosophy? by asking, Whois the philosopher? This move re-centers 
questions of knowledge to questions of the person, where knowledge becomes a question 
of shaping the individual. As Hadot notes of Aristotle, “For Aristotle true knowledge is 
born only from long familiarity with concepts and methods . . . without this personal 
effort, the auditor cannot assimilate discourse; it will remain useless to him.”8 
Knowledge and truth, then, are grown inside the individual through effort and practice. 
In this essay, I describe the work of Hadot and Sloterdijk in terms of this question, 
Who is the Philosopher?, charting the path of training by means of the individual habits 
and exercises related to self-overcoming and self-transformation; then in terms of their 
relation to the city and the community, particularly in relation to the habitus of cultural 
convention; and finally in terms of the built environments and practice zones that enable 
philosophical activity, including the affordances, to borrow James Gibson’s term, that 
promote the individual’s capacity to perform certain maneuvers in thought through the 
basecamps, enclaves, and microclimates of the practicing life.  
The point here is not that Hadot and Sloterdijk offer an identical perspective on 
philosophical ascetism. Indeed, they may in the end promote different side views. 
However, such similarities and differences are not the primary focus in this essay, as the 
side view, much like the routines and exercises of the athlete, draws from a variety of 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 35. 
4 Ibid., p. 29. 
5 Ibid., pp. 24–27. 
6 Ibid., p. 27. 
7 Ibid., p. 62. 
8 Ibid., p. 89. 
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disciplines and methods to achieve its aims. In the essay, then, I aim for a general 
practice view of philosophy more than a confrontation between Hadot and Sloterdijk, 
though such an effort would be beneficial in a future context. 
THE ATHLETIC RENAISSANCE: GRIPPING THE ROOTS OF HABIT 
Throughout The Art of Philosophy and You Must Change Your Life, Sloterdijk gives the 
philosopher multiple names, as though the number of monikers were itself a kind of 
exercise or repetition. Who is the philosopher? Sloterdijk writes of Homo repetitivus, Homo 
artista, and Homo immunologicus.9 This human-in-training is a general ascetologist, a 
studier of self-disciplines, and an athlete in pursuit of mechané (cunning), 
anthropotechnics (the language of practicing or self-forming), and the bios theoritikos (the 
contemplative life).10 This practitioner is engaged in a “philosophical multisport” in “the 
exercise of existence.”11 The pursuit of these “ability systems” forms the basis for a 
“somatic idealism” and an intellectual athleticism, an athleticism that Sloterdijk notes 
“should be taken as literally as possible.”12Hadot says nearly the same thing: the exercises 
of reason are for the soul “analogous to the athlete’s training.”13 
Training Regimes in the Philosophical Life 
Sloterdijk’s and Hadot’s side views of philosophy comprise the training regimes of the 
philosophical life and, to some extent, form the goal of philosophy itself. Hadot writes, 
“self-transformation is never definitive, but demands perpetual reconquest.”14 As an 
ongoing contemplative exercise, philosophy is an inner dialogue of the self with itself, a 
preparatory initiation for wisdom.15 “The relationship between theory and practice in 
the philosophy of [ancient Greece],” writes Hadot, “must be understood from the 
perspective of these exercises of meditation. Theory is never considered an end in itself; 
it is clearly and decidedly put in the service of practice.”16 
Along these lines, Sloterdijk will speak of gripping the roots of habit: “The human 
being owned by its habits must succeed in reversing the conditions of ownership and 
                                                          
9 Peter Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life (Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2013b), p. 10. 
10 Ibid., pp. 47, 170. 
11 Ibid., p. 154.  
12 Ibid., p. 155. 
13 Ibid., p. 59. 
14 Ibid., p. 36. 
15 Ibid., p. 64. 
16 Ibid., p. 60. 
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taking control of that which has it by having itself.”17 Importantly, for Sloterdijk, the 
overcoming and developing of habits (hexis) is also a recognition of habits. The hexis or 
habit is an active condition of the individual, “a pre-personally based generative 
principle of action,”18 which underpins ethical achievement; it is a skill of virtue. As 
habits become explicit in perception so too does the potential to overcome or transform 
them. To overcome habit is to exert a distance from habit, to differentiate oneself from 
the repetitions of the past, making explicit what were previously unconscious orderings 
in action and perception.  
Sloterdijk positions habits along with passions as the two forms of possession that 
advance or stall the person in its stages of development.19 Writing on the subject’s 
possession in these two states, Sloterdijk writes, “Possessed by habits and inertias, it 
appears under-animated and mechanized; possessed by passions and ideas, it is over-
animated and manically overloaded.”20 The inertia of habit requires a passionate 
response, one that enacts “new configurations between contemplation and fitness.”21 
Habit on this view is a gravitational field, and philosophers must achieve escape 
velocity to change the conditions of their existence. Sloterdijk writes, “The adept can 
only rid themselves of their baggage by subjecting their life to a rigorous practice regime 
by which they can de-automatize their behavior in all important dimensions. At the 
same time, they must re-automatize their newly learned behavior so that what they want 
to be or represent becomes second nature.”22 De-automatizing, re-automatizing, and 
thus transforming the conditions of existence are the aims of practice, but practice 
cannot succeed in isolation, nor is individual transformation necessarily the ultimate 
goal.  
The Side View: Ancient and Modern 
While the habits and exercises of the side view seem to prefer the Greek philosophies 
emerging out of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and from the later Hellenistic and 
Imperial periods in Greece’s philosophical history, Hadot is clear that the askēsis of self-
transformation is also central to modern philosophical projects, including those of Renée 
Descartes and Immanuel Kant.23 Specifically, Hadot sees Descartes as committed to an 
                                                          
17 Ibid., p. 170. 
18 Ibid., p. 183. 
19 Ibid., p. 122. 
20 Ibid., p. 168. 
21 Ibid., p. 155. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, pp. 253–270. 
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askēsis of the soul: “I believe that when Descartes chose to give one of his works the title 
Meditations, he knew perfectly well that the word designated an exercise of the soul within 
the tradition of ancient spirituality.”24 
With this view in my mind, argues Hadot, each of Descartes’s meditations should 
be viewed as a series of exercises practiced with the goal of bringing into relief a new 
understanding of consciousness. This sequence of Cartesian exercises—of first 
expressing a methodical doubt about reality and experience, then of becoming aware of 
the self as a thinking reality, and then finally of separating out from the self the world of 
passing sensations—form the ground of the insights Descartes achieved.  
To take Descartes’s insights out of the context of his practices, which he deliberately 
offers to the reader as a way of reproducing his understanding, would be, says Hadot, 
to miss the point of the Meditations all together. Further, Hadot suggests, such a new self-
consciousness must not only be achieved once but must be re-achieved again and again 
so that the new consciousness may gain entry into the permanent memory of the body.25 
The realization of truth in this way requires more than evidence or logical argument, 
but also the askēsis of the self in dialogue with itself as it advances through a specific series 
of deliberately designed meditative exercises.  
On Hadot’s reading, this same interpretation—that modern philosophical works 
cannot be divorced from the practices that rendered them—is true of the works of Kant. 
“The entire edifice of critical Kantian philosophy,” writes Hadot, “has meaning only 
from the perspective of wisdom, or rather from that of the sage.”26Hadot in this context 
takes up Kant’s own distinction between “scholastic” and “worldly” philosophy.27 The 
former philosophy is content with being systematic, with remaining at the level of pure 
theory, and at the level of the disengaged professor who does not practice. The latter 
takes up the task of living in the cosmic world of the human individual, who lives 
according to the Idea of the sage, the ideal philosopher. As Hadot notes of Kant, such a 
sage does not in actuality exist, at least not as any one person, but rather forms a lure, a 
regulative ideal, for our moral and philosophical actions. In this, says Hadot, Kant links 
the cosmic perspective of the ideal sage to the concrete practicality of our efforts to 
transform ourselves for the betterment of the world.28 
While Hadot spends the most time making a case for the askēsisof Descartes and 
Kant, he also goes to some length to secure for Merleau-Ponty, Montaigne, Nietzsche, 
                                                          
24 Ibid., p. 264. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., p. 266. 
27 Ibid., p. 267. 
28 Ibid., p. 270. 
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Wittgenstein, and several others a place in the lineage of practicing philosophers. “All, 
in one way or another,” writes Hadot, “were influenced by the model of ancient 
philosophy, and conceived of philosophy not only as a concrete, practical activity but 
also as a transformation of our way of inhabiting and perceiving the world.”29 
The side view thus tracks an active history of philosophical practice still in operation 
today, though it tracks one that is not necessarily neatly (or even partly) coincident with 
the professional arrangement of philosophy professors.  
CARE FOR THE SELF, CARE FOR THE CITY: THE PHILOSOPHER AS 
INTERMEDIARY 
Far from being an activity of isolated individuals, the side view sees philosophy as a 
community practice. In this way, the practice of the self is deeply connected to a care 
for the city, for the community at large. At the same time, the philosopher is the one 
who stands partly at a distance from the community. Socrates, for example, both marks 
a break with and participates in the daily life of Athens, his city (polis). As Hadot writes, 
“Socrates is simultaneously in the world and outside it. . . . He is involved with people 
and with things because the only true philosophy lies in the everyday.”30 
While Socrates is involved in the city and its activities, he is also átopos—strange, 
extravagant, absurd, or placeless.31 Thus just as the philosopher lives the bios theoretikos 
she also lives the bios xenikos, the life of the stranger, a part of the world but a bit askew 
from it, neither in the world nor completely outside of it.32 “The philosopher,” writes 
Hadot, “is not only an intermediary being, but . . . is also a mediator. . . . He is not at 
home in either the world of senseless people or the world of sages; neither wholly in the 
world of men and women, nor wholly in the world of gods.”33 
Above all, the philosopher is cognizant of ignorance. The philosopher emerges in 
this context as the one who stands outside the moment, the culture, and the context. 
This act of standing outside, of seceding from the habitual world, is on Sloterdijk’s 
account the primary ethical act.34 The philosopher is thus a stranger to the given, or, 
equally, the philosopher is the one who makes the given appear strange. As a stranger 
to the given, the philosopher can enact a unique relation to the appearances of this 
                                                          
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., pp. 37–38. 
31 Ibid., p. 30.  
32 Peter Sloterdijk, The Art of Philosophy: Wisdom as Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), p. 
8. 
33 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 47. 
34 Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life, p. 219. 
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world, as one who influences in a new way the form of givenness as it is received, acting 
with a certain skill on the aesthetic rendering of the phenomena perceived.  
On the one hand, then, the philosopher, exemplified by Socrates, makes a “radical 
break” with daily life whilst still being fully immersed in it, immersed because he cares 
for his fellow citizens, immersed because philosophy must occur in the streets, not in the 
privation of the withdrawn inner life.35 While on the other, says Hadot, the goal is “to 
learn a type of know-how; to develop a habitus, or new capacity to judge and to criticize; 
and to transform—that is, to change people’s way of living and of seeing the world.”36 
Through these means, the philosopher enhances the capacity for freedom, and thus for 
acting ethically. To take but one example of this goal, we could look to Plato and 
Aristotle, for whom philosophy was a means of achieving freedom from political 
corruption,37 and for attaining an inner autonomy that could nullify social convention.38 
Care for the self, through rigorous self-examination, and care for the city, through 
participation in its affairs, are thus deeply linked. Hadot writes that philosophy, “is 
essentially an effort to become aware of ourselves, our being-in-the-world, and our 
being-with-others.”39 Whilst a necessarily communal person, the philosopher differs 
from the senseless people who believe they are not ignorant, who believe in their own 
stories about what the world is and who they are. The philosopher sees that until we 
take hold of and examine ourselves our understandings and assumptions will remain 
largely the product of imitation, the outcome of an unquestioned inertia of local opinion.  
In seizing the local habitus, the human-in-training reverses the pull of custom and 
habit, exiting the automaticity of the unexamined life. I quote Sloterdijk at length: 
Swimming in the waters of habitus, discourses, and language games, is one thing; 
getting out and watching one’s fellow humans from the edge as they swim in the 
habitus pool is another. As soon as this difference develops a language of its own 
to become a doctrine and life form, those based on the shore distance themselves 
from the swimmers. When, therefore, the ancient Indians discovered the observer 
or witness consciousness and equated it with atman, the subjective world principle, 
they created routes of access to a surplus of attention that simultaneously silences 
and mobilizes them.And when Heraclitus deems it impossible to step into the same 
river twice, this may be a passing reference to the irreversible stream of 
becoming—which is how the dictum is often read, in convenient analogy to 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p. 37. 
36 Ibid., p. 274. 
37 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, p. 93. 
38 Ibid., p. 111. 
39 Ibid., p. 276. 
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“everything flows.” In reality, the opaque formula reminds us of a deeper 
irreversibility: whoever steps out of the water can no longer return to the first way 
of swimming.40 
Stepping out of the waters of habit, the philosopher sits on the shore, working in the 
medium of perception and enacting a shift in the phenomenal display, re-inscribing it 
with a new arrangement of meaning and significance.  
In caring for and examining the self, the philosopher exercises an anthropotechnics 
that makes explicit the conditions of daily life, calling others to question those conditions. 
Crucially, the philosopher does not ask that we move from one habitus to the next, but 
that we cultivate a continuous practice, moving from the formal to the forming, from 
the formed to the formless, and back again. In other words, this process is ongoing and 
must be achieved again and again. 
THE PRACTICE ZONE: AFFORDANCES AND BASECAMPS 
Just as philosophical training requires a community of practitioners and training 
partners, so too does it require a practice landscape for its execution. James Gibson’s 
theory of affordances is instructive here, as it suggests that what we perceive in the 
environment is not so much the properties of individual objects but rather 
the possibilities for action they enable.41 On Gibson’s view, an environment is best 
understood as a set of affordances made available by an animal’s capacities. For 
example, an environment may afford climbing, sheltering, swimming, or standing. In 
built environments, we can see a gymnasium as affording fitness, a town square as 
affording meeting, a library as affording reading, and so on. These media ecologies are 
design spaces for the focusing of certain capacities, including philosophical capacities. 
Plato’s Academy as Epoché  
For example, Sloterdijk sees Plato’s Academy as a specific kind of affordance space, a 
space that affords a kind of architectural epoché. In Edmund Husserl’s sense, the epochéis 
an attitude towards perception, cognition, and ideas themselves, for affecting them in 
specific ways. Dan Zahavi describes epoché as an “abrupt suspension of a naive 
metaphysical attitude,”42 while Evan Thompson suggests it is “the flexible and trainable 
mental skill of being able to suspend one’s inattentive immersion in experience and to 
turn one’s attention to the manner in which something appears or is given to 
                                                          
40 Ibid., p. 191. 
41 See Gibson’s The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New York: Psychology Press, 2014).   
42 Dan Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 46. 
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experience.”43 John Cogan calls it simply “the name for whatever method we use to free 
ourselves from the captivity of the unquestioned acceptance of the everyday world.”44 
While these definitions of epoché focus on the efforts of individuals, Sloterdijk has 
something else in mind. That is to say, the architecture of the Academy affords 
something like an environmental epoché, a design space intended to produce 
philosophical effects in the person. Sloterdijk writes: 
Plato was concerned to provide appropriate accommodation for persons in the 
precarious state of complete devotion to their thoughts. The original Academy was 
dedicated to nothing other than innovation in spatial creation. The academy is the 
architectural equivalent of what Husserl apostrophized as epoché—a building for 
shutting out the world and bracketing in concern, an asylum for the mysterious 
guests that we call ideas and theorems. In today’s parlance, we would call it a 
retreat or a hideaway.45 
In other words, the Academy is an affordance space, mostly backgrounded in action, 
but often a precondition for certain kinds of thinking. The activity of mind in this way 
takes as its condition of possibility a whole ecology of material affordance spaces, sets of 
architectural epoché that complement and enable the individual’s capacity to perform 
certain maneuvers in thought, maneuvers that make apparent the material conditions 
of possibility required for the bios theoretikos. 
 Elsewhere but in the same spirit, Sloterdijk appeals to a “spiritual form of spatial 
planning,” and to a secession from the “trivial continuum” of other spaces in the social 
order.46 Among the spaces of spiritual planning we could list hermitages, monasteries, 
libraries, concert halls, groves, cemeteries, and cathedrals. These medium–
environments are immersive technologies for the installation of higher—often cosmic—
visions in the eyes of the practicing. While immersive, they also make a cut or a break 
with the daily world, offering reprieve and secession for the practitioner. “Secession,” 
writes Sloterdijk, “produces real spaces. It sets up borders behind which a genuinely 
different mode of being dictates its will. . . . Wherever secessionists dwell, the rules of 
actually existing surrealism apply.”47 
                                                          
43 Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 19. 
44 Cogan, “The Phenomenological Reduction,” in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, section 5a paragraph 6. 
45 Sloterdijk, The Art of Philosophy, pp. 32–33. 
46 Sloterdijk, You Must Change Your Life, pp. 221, 222. 
47 Ibid. 
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While Sloterdijk emphasizes Plato’s Academy, one could also investigate, as Hadot 
does briefly,48 the construction of other philosophical institutions, such as those of 
Aristotle (the Lyceum), Epicurus (the Garden), and Zeno (the Stoa), each places of 
practice that lasted for centuries. Along the lines of philosophical media ecologies and 
basecamps, one wonders if, alongside different beliefs and practices, these schools did 
not also differ in design and setting, each one affording an intricate mood or ambiance 
encouraging of that school’s discipline and world view. One also wonders whether or 
not the modern classroom provides anything like this requisite philosophical ambiance. 
Techniques of the Enclave 
In any case, the architectural epoché aims at the production of enclaves and microclimates 
designed for promoting the practicing life.49 Such bases of operation afford cultivation 
of the perceptual arena, allowing for the sustainment of design atmospheres suited for 
the growth of new capacities and insights. These techniques of the enclave aid the art of 
withdrawal and promote the task of self-differentiation. In these microclimates, writes 
Sloterdijk, “The autoplastic effect of practicing ensures that the witness consciousness 
ingrains itself ever more deeply in the contemplator’s bodily memory.”50 
As with Hadot’s commentary on Descartes’s Meditations, we see here a return to the 
idea of repetition. The new insight—in this case, the awareness of the witness 
consciousness—must be achieved multiple times if it is to stabilize as part of the 
practitioner’s repertoire of capacities. In this the contemplative capacity is identical to 
its somatic or athletic counterpart. Each new skill must be practiced over and over. 
These repetitions, we can now say, form the basis of what we call philosophy. Philosophy 
is the sport of contemplative repetition; its court is the practitioner’s enclave. 
Philosophy thus issues from within different ecosystems of activity, from within 
different practice landscapes and basecamps, to use Sloterdijk’s term. However, much 
like secession can occur anywhere secessionists dwell, so too are the basecamps of the 
practicing person none other than the person’s own ecology of practices, to borrow 
Isabelle Stengers’s term,51 and such places of practice can emerge anywhere. In 
Sloterdijk’s words, “They come about wherever those practicing parties who have 
resolved to secede step out of the river of habits.”52 In taking present action as the co-
                                                          
48 Hadot, What is Ancient Philosophy?, pp. 98–99. 
49 Ibid., pp. 228–229. 
50 Ibid., p. 238. 
51 See Stengers Cosmopolitics II (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). 
52 Ibid., p. 222. 
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condition for future execution,53 then, a summit is always a new basecamp, a new 
basecamp merely an old summit.  
Thus the distinction between basecamps and summits implodes, as these iterative 
stages, each one a repetition built upon the competencies stabilized in previous practice, 
mark the curved space of human repetition. Sloterdijk notes, “Being human means 
existing in an operatively curved space in which actions return to affect the actor, works 
the worker, communications the communicator, thoughts the thinker, and feelings the 
feeler.”54 The curved topology of human practice in this sense forms a symbolic shell or 
membrane, an immunological sphere that surrounds the movement towards new 
freedoms and opportunities for action.55 Architectural epoché can enhance these activities, 
but it is ultimately the practitioner’s task to setup camp where life requires it. 
SUMMING UP: THE PLANET OF THE PRACTICING 
Philosophy is a way of life, a way of life linked to philosophical discourse, to the exercises 
and modes of being that produce philosophers. This approach, as we have seen, is both 
the expression and the means. In sum, the side view tilts the axis of history by ninety 
degrees, viewing philosophers as they emerge from the stream of local opinion, as they 
make explicit through rigorous self-examination the inertia of habit. Working in the 
medium of perception, the philosopher’s anthropotechnic ability aims at a care for the 
city, for the community at large. In the basecamps and enclaves of the practicing life, 
architecture becomes a deliberate enhancement of these curved practice topologies, 
providing an arena for the repetitions required of contemplative practice.  
It is perhaps because so much labor and material has been spent on the production 
of practice spaces—in the creation of universities and laboratories, stadiums and 
bathhouses, cities and towns, homes and taverns, monasteries and cathedrals, retreats 
and healing centers, gymnasia and weight rooms, libraries and conservatories, recording 
studios and publishing houses, design companies and concert halls—that Sloterdijk, 
following Nietzsche, calls the Earth “the planet of the practicing.”56 The planet of the 
practicing foregrounds not just the curved topology of human existence, but the 
spherical nature of the planet itself. Humans and their communities and base camps are 
practicing spheres spinning through space on a sphere of practice. 
                                                          
53 The phrase is adapted from Sloterdijk, The Art of Philosophy, p. 8. 
54 Ibid., p. 110. 
55 Peter Sloterdijk, Bubbles: Spheres Volume 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2011). 
56 This is the subtitle Sloterdijk gives to the first section of You Must Change Your Life. 
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Turning earth material into cultural design, these practitioners, all philosophers in 
their own ways, cross the so-called nature–culture divide. “In truth,” writes Sloterdijk, 
“the crossing from nature to culture and vice versa has always stood wide open. It leads 
across an easily accessible bridge: the practicing life. People have committed themselves 
to its construction since they came into existence—or rather, people came into existence 
by applying themselves to the building of said bridge.”57 
But what are they building, really? Where does the bridge lead? It may be that they 
are building a bridge to the planet itself, a bridge for the making explicit of the planet as 
a planet through a cosmic affordance space, the cultivated Earth system. In any case, 
with the advent of the Anthropocene, practice is now a planetary matter, a matter of 
making the planet matter by bringing its primacy to the forefront of perception and 
action. Who are the philosophers? They are the practitioners of planet Earth, the ascetic 
planet.  
To be sure, making explicit the planetary nature of human existence is a lofty goal. 
However, as Sloterdijk is fond of noting, “small human forces can achieve the impossible 
if they are multiplied by the larger distance of practice.”58 An effort multiplied by the 
larger distance of practice, and, without a doubt, by the ever-increasing numbers of 
available practitioners. There is hope in this view. These athletes of mind and technique 
are bringing the planet of the practicing into view, creating opportunities for the 
ecological philosophies of the future, and perhaps for a planetary civilization, too. To 
close with Sloterdijk’s words one final time, “[The Earth] is now the transcendental star 
that comes into play as the locational condition for all self-reflections.”59 
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